Thor's Anvil (Kirov Series Book 26) Page 4

  “You mean you have other carriers in the pipeline?”

  “Correct. We can build a carrier on one of those four hulls twice as fast as we might build a battlecruiser or battleship. Even the third of the Yamato Class hulls was converted to build a carrier under this program, the largest in the world when it is completed—Shinano. We also have several smaller carriers in the shadow fleet program, conversions from fast liners and such.”

  “Will any be ready soon?”

  “Not soon enough, as far as my needs are concerned. Here we are discussing how to manage a war on three fronts, and there will never be enough carriers to go around. We are fortunate that the design of Taiho was accelerated before the war, and I suppose we still have the battleship proponents to thank for the innovations in that ship. We will take your advice concerning those empty spaces around the aviation fuel bunkers, and better damage control. As for the bigger hulls now under conversion, the two ships in the Amagi Class will be the first to appear, perhaps within six to eight months if the resources can be found. We have named them Mikasa and Shirane. Much effort is being made to complete Shinano as well.”

  “Interesting…. That ship was not ordered converted to a carrier until the Midway disaster,” said Fukada. “Nor was Taiho built this early. In fact, it was the need for more toughness and durability at sea that led to the ideas put into that carrier. Very strange.”

  “I won a few arguments in 1940,” said Yamamoto. “That is why we even have these abandoned hulls intact for these projects. As for toughness, the side armor was already there for Mikasa and Shirane when they were laid down as battlecruisers. The armored deck idea was taken from the British when we obtained the plans for their Illustrious Class carriers. Frankly, if I had my way I would gladly trade this massive battleship we stand on now, and its sister ship Musashi, for two more fleet carriers. The loss of both Zuikaku and Shokaku has set us back a great deal. It seems I have avoided this Midway disaster you speak of, but the 5th of May in the Koro Sea was a hard day for us. Believe me, our shipyards have been very busy ever since that day.”

  “Let us hope you can produce these ships in time,” said Harada.

  “Alright, gentlemen, I see now what we are up against, and what you say is true, the next six to eight months will be the crucial time. If we do not prevail now, then it may not matter whether Shinano and other conversion programs like Shirane ever set sail. We still have five fleet carriers, and they have only two. Now is the time to win this war, and you can do your part in the Indian Ocean.”

  “Sir, when would you want this operation to begin?”

  “Not for some time. The fleet is reorganizing along the lines we have discussed. Take your ship to Davao. A tanker will be waiting off shore for you to refuel. From there you will proceed to Singapore. The ash from that volcano is still a persistent haze in that region. It has been erupting off and on for months, so have a care. The Sunda Strait is still a very dangerous place. Once you arrive, refuel again and wait for Admiral Hara’s task force. He will transmit your orders at that time.”

  The meeting ended on a high note, for all present could still take some solace from their superiority in carrier numbers. But their calculus was already off, for even as they spoke, the USS Essex was slipping out to sea on her maiden voyage. It was not supposed to be commissioned until December of 1942, reaching the Pacific in July after an extensive series of sea trials. But many things in the history were askew, and the Essex program was also accelerated. The need being so great, the ship was already enroute to the Pacific, and so the four carriers Yamamoto hoped to challenge the Americans with off Fiji, might soon be facing three on the American side. Yet no one knew that when the meeting ended.

  They would know it soon enough.

  Part II

  Operation C

  “Clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark … to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.”

  — Niccolo Machiavelli

  Chapter 4

  The plans that then developed from the meeting between Yamamoto and the officers off the Takami were clearly aimed at finding the strategy that would win the war, achieving some decisive advantage in the time frame Harada had put forward. They had six to eight months to prevent any US counteroffensive from gaining traction in 1943. With winter coming, Yamamoto ordered all his fleet carriers to leave the Home Islands and muster at Truk. He wanted them as far from the unseen raider in the Siberian north as possible. The Siberians would be opposed by the Army and air force instead, and no longer challenged at sea. All remaining carrier power would be concentrated in the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean operation.

  Now Yamamoto took stock of the forces he might have available. The 2nd Infantry Division, savaged by the eruption at Krakatoa, was slowly being rebuilt from new conscripts in Japan for anticipated operations in the south. One regiment was being built in Nasu, another at Sato, and the third at Fukushima. With the 48th Division already committed to Fiji, if the Ceylon operation should ever materialize, it would be given to the 5th Division, which was still a strong two regiment nucleus that could receive replacements and become a full triangular division, though it would never again be the powerful force it was as a square division under Yamashita. The Battle at Tengah Airfield on Singapore had killed many of its toughest veteran troops.

  If necessary, General Nishimura stated that he would consider releasing one regiment of the Imperial Guards for deployment on Ceylon after it was taken, but only if the Army could not make a similar force available at Rangoon from the troops already committed to the Burma campaign.

  All in all, Japan now bet its fortunes on the outcome of these crucial operations in the south. The additional land territory they might take was minimal, but the strategic windfall in being able to control the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, and in isolating Australia from the US, would be significant if they could be achieved. Everything would be risked on achieving that outcome, but the one factor the planners were leaving out of their thinking, the sea monster they had come to call Mizuchi, would still remain a dangerous wildcard.

  Yet Yamamoto was a realist, and the images he had seen in the library aboard Takami still haunted him. He was well aware that other staff officers at Imperial General Headquarters thought that even the push into the Solomons was an overextension of Japan’s military capabilities. Now, to add the Indian Ocean as an objective seemed an even greater reach. So we will simply aim higher, he thought.

  To win in the south he had to first secure Fiji, and that could only be done if he achieved decisive naval superiority there. If he could not do that, then the Americans would have a strong base to organize further offensives into the Solomons, or against the French New Hebrides. He knew that New Caledonia, and particularly the major port there at Noumea, was a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it thrust like a dagger between Fiji and Australia, but if Fiji were to fall, it would then be subject to attack from both those enemy camps.

  Australia was also of great concern, for in it the Allies possessed what appeared to be an unassailable anvil upon which to forge their weapons of war. The vast Pacific Ocean offered endless sea lanes. Though it would take much longer, American convoys could venture deep into the South Pacific if they had to, and approach New Zealand from the southeast. In time, they would still get enough troops, supplies and equipment to Australia and New Zealand to pose an offensive threat.

  In the north, though New Guinea had been mostly cleared of enemy presence, there was still a nest at Milne Bay that had to be taken, and the Port of Darwin on the North coast might be used as a base for a thrust into the Arafura or Banda Seas. That would be possible only if the enemy achieved naval superiority, but he had to always keep it in the back of his mind. Perhaps he should take Admiral Hara’s advice, and permit him to make a landing at Darwin, anchoring the defense there i
nstead of at Dili on the Island of Timor.

  Then there were the British, who had a division at Perth to use if they should want to strike at the barrier islands again. That was why he decided to send Harada and his ship into the Indian Ocean. If Hara’s carriers could defeat the British squadron, and occupy Ceylon, any threat from the British would be completely neutralized. And then, there was always the possibility that the Americans might use their base at Hawaii to strike directly into the Marshalls, or attempt to retake Wake Island. From those bases they could attack the Marianas, and such a strategy would completely bypass the Solomons, New Hebrides and New Guinea. That was what they actually did in those books the Admiral reviewed. And then there was the problem on Karafuto Island, where the Siberians had been stopped by the Japanese 7th Division, but still represented a serious danger.

  So many threats, from so many directions, and the defense rested primarily with the navy. At first glance, it seemed that all the dramatic gains achieved in 1942 were war winners, but Yamamoto knew that even his face cards could be taken by the enemy trump cards. Yet ‘life was not a matter of holding good cards,’ said Robert Louis Stevenson, ‘but of playing a poor hand well.’ Yamamoto was considering how to play out the hand he now held to win this game, and it was time to lead. He wanted no shadow over his shoulder when he finally turned to face the Americans again.

  * * *

  In the high summer of 1942, Great Britain, which had stood alone in the west since the fall of France, at last had a powerful Ally in the United States. In spite of that, the British Empire still remained under grave threat, and Churchill could see shadows everywhere he looked. The German Occupation of Norway, with their new major base at Nordstern, was a constant threat to the northern seas, and served to sever the line of communications to Soviet Russia at Murmansk. The U-Boat threat was at its height, making cross Atlantic communications with the US precarious. Britain’s Pacific holdings, chiefly Hong Kong and Singapore, had been smashed and occupied by Japan, and now the Japanese were in Burma.

  In this light, the British occupation of Madagascar, taken from the French in May of 1942 in this history, and its strong presence on Ceylon at Colombo were now the two bastions of power aimed at securing lines of communications through the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Those lines reached out to Australia and New Zealand, and had once linked India with the Empire’s Pacific holdings before the war. Now they served commercial shipping to ports like Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, where the Jewel of Britain’s occidental empire, India, was slowly coming under increasing threat from the Japanese.

  The brief but violent British assault on French held Madagascar had taken place right on schedule, between the 5th and 7th of May. As such, it was eclipsed by the far larger battle off Fiji then underway, and the decisive collision in the Koro Sea. Yet for the British, seizing Madagascar was of great significance. It was one of two vital possessions Vichy France held that the Allies dearly coveted, the other being the New Hebrides.

  “We already know what the French have suggested,” said Churchill to Brooke when the matter had come up. “They’ll go so far as to hand the entire island right over to the Japanese. Then what? From there they will have cut us off from Ceylon and India, and if they take that naval base, they can put bombers on Durban, and stop every last convoy we send around the Cape. It would be a disaster of the first order, so that place simply must be taken. I don’t care how we do it, or where the troops come from. You must find them, and carry it off like a thief in the night before the Japanese realize what they’ve lost.”

  Brooke handed the matter to Tovey for the naval arm, and he teed up Illustrious and Indomitable with 82 planes to cover the operation. He then scraped up the 29th Independent Brigade, the 13th and 17th Brigades of 5th Division, the 7th South African and Rhodesian 27th Brigades. Number 5 Commando would be on the cutting edge of the attack. This was a force of some 15,000 troops against the French garrison of 8,000 troops and six tanks, with 32 antiquated planes.

  The landings had occurred at the northernmost tip of the island where the vital protective Diego Suarez Bay provided one of the best anchorages in the Indian Ocean. The 29th Brigade was the hammer that struck that anvil, with the other British forces following later. The action in the north was a great success, and though low level fighting continued for the next 45 days, Churchill had Madagascar, and saw it as a great outer bulwark protecting the vital Cape Town region.

  When ULTRA intercepts indicated that the enemy was now planning a sortie into the Indian Ocean, it was therefore cause for some alarm in Whitehall. It was clear what their objective might be—Ceylon. If japan were to take that, they could use it to base aircraft, naval units and submarines that could pose a threat as far away as the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Beyond that, Ceylon was also a source of over 90% of Britain’s rubber, and it would produce 60% of the rubber all the Allied powers used, a resource that was much needed in wartime. All those tires on trucks and planes needed it, and it had many other wartime applications. Ceylon was also a major producer of tea, and that, too was a vital resource insofar as the British were concerned.

  Yet for all that virtue, Ceylon’s liability was that it could not produce enough food to feed its local population. As Hara’s carriers headed west, there was no more than 14 days supply of rice on the Island, and the island needed to import over half a million tons of rice per year. Some of it came from India, more from the Middle East, and that meant the waters around the island were full of merchant shipping on those thin, highly vulnerable sea lanes. The Japanese knew this, and therefore one of Vice Admiral Ozawa’s chief objectives, in addition to screening Hara’s carriers, was to seek out and destroy merchant shipping off the coast of India.

  And so just one brief look at a single piece of the great puzzle that had been the British Empire, was quite revealing. This piece was particularly important, for it connected directly to great segments of the puzzle on either side, the Australian and New Zealand Commonwealth to the east, and India to the north. Remove it from British control, and a deadly gap appeared in the puzzle that could only be filled again by fire, steel, and blood. In many ways, it was more strategic then Malta was in the Med, or even Gibraltar, and perhaps even the equal of the Suez Canal in terms of importance to that theater. Churchill himself commented that the approach of Japanese naval units to Ceylon filled him with dread.

  “The most dangerous moment of the War, and the one which caused me the greatest alarm, was when the Japanese Fleet was heading for Ceylon and the naval base there. The capture of Ceylon, the consequent control of the Indian Ocean, and the possibility at the same time of a German conquest of Egypt would have closed the ring and the future would have been black.”

  British power to protect and secure the vital resources and lines of communication flowing through Ceylon now rested on Somerville’s Indian Ocean Squadron, three carriers, three old battleships, three heavy cruisers and a few other light cruisers and destroyers. After watching the Japanese destroy Pearl Harbor, seize the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, push boldly into the Solomons and all the way to Fiji, Churchill had every reason to be fearful with the coming of this news.

  In early July, he had very little to defend that island. He had pleaded with Prime Minister Curtin to allow him to keep two regiments of the Australian 6th Division there, but the loss of Port Moresby and the brief Japanese air raid on Port Darwin had ended any hope of achieving that. So it was then down to the British 34th Indian Division, reinforced earlier that year with the arrival of the 16th British Regiment, and the HQ and 21st Regiment of the 11th East African Division. A few security battalions had been raised among the locals, but that was it, with service troops in the two major ports, some AA guns and radar crews.

  A squadron of Blenheim bombers arrived at Colombo from Greece, and was operating at the improved airfield at Ratmalana with a squadron of Fulmars. Two squadrons of Hurricanes came all the way from North Africa to China Bay at Trin
comalee, where the racecourse had been converted to a makeshift airfield. At Trincomalee, or ‘Trinco’ as the British called it, the posh country club, became a headquarters; the tennis courts were used to grow vegetables, and the Cricket Fields and club became the domain of the R.A.F pilots. On the southern tip of the island, a small lake at Koggala was a perfect basing spot for Catalina search planes. Up on Adams Peak east of Colombo, one of the highest in the central island mountains, the British had deployed an air search radar set to sweep the seas in all directions around the island.

  There, an imprint in a boulder was said to be the left footprint of the Buddha itself. The Hindus claimed it was the footprint of Lord Shiva, the Muslims that of Adam. Others said it was the tread of the god Saman, the deity of the rising sun, and so all these legends made the place a sacred site that drew many pilgrims in better times. Now it was the searching eye and ears of the Royal Navy, for this time, a different rising sun was coming to Ceylon with Admiral Hara’s 3rd Carrier Division.

  As on Singapore, rumors of impending doom began to spread. The locals had all heard what happened in Hong Kong, of the Chinese massacred at Singapore and other tales of Japanese atrocities. Many were already heading for the highland, thinking it would be a sanctuary in the event the Japanese invaded. The exodus from the coastal areas was so pronounced, that the ship repair company at Colombo, which normally employed 3600 locals, suddenly found that only 76 showed up for work. Fear was a toxin that could spread faster than Malaria, but it may have been well justified.

  The Japanese were coming, and with some of the very best troops in the army, the survivors of numerous campaigns in China, Malaya and the costly battle for Singapore. The 11th Regiment of the 5th Division was already boarding the transports at Singapore, and the clock was ticking.